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Some modern cosmological models predict the appearance of Boltzmann Brains:
observers who randomly fluctuate out of a thermal bath rather than naturally
evolving from a low-entropy Big Bang. A theory in which most observers are
of the Boltzmann Brain type is generally thought to be unacceptable, although
opinions differ. I argue that such theories are indeed unacceptable: the real
problem is with fluctuations into observers who are locally identical to ordinary
observers, and their existence cannot be swept under the rug by a choice of
probability distributions over observers. The issue is not that the existence of
such observers is ruled out by data, but that the theories that predict them are
cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed.
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1
If you want to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe.
– Carl Sagan
1 Introduction
Modern cosmology has put us in a predicament that Rene´ Descartes had worked to escape
from in the seventeenth century. In a famous thought experiment in his Meditations on First
Philosophy, Descartes sought a basis for absolutely certain knowledge. You might think
that the floor on which you are standing certainly exists, but Descartes worried that this
impression could be mistaken; maybe you are actually dreaming, or you are being misled
by a powerful, evil demon. (Today we might fear that we are a brain in a vat, or living
in a computer simulation.) Descartes eventually decides that there is something he can’t
consistently doubt: namely, that he is thinking these doubts, and that therefore he must
exist. That is something about which he can be absolutely certain. The road from his own
existence to the reliability of his senses is a convoluted one, going through an ontological
argument for the existence of God, about which later commentators have been justifiably
skeptical.
The issue is undoubtedly important. We use the evidence of our senses as the basis of
the scientific process; we collect data, and use that to test and refine models that describe
the world. If that evidence were completely unreliable, science itself would be impossible.
But even without a Cartesian bedrock of certainty to undergird trust in our senses, it seems
reasonable (at least for working scientists, if not always for more fastidious philosophers) to
take the reliability of what we see as an assumption. Absent some strong reason to believe
that there actually is an evil demon trying to trick us, it seems natural to put a high credence
in the basic accuracy of our manifest picture of the world, and work from there.
The problem arises when we start with our experience of the world, use it to construct
our best theory of how the world actually operates, and then realize that this theory itself
predicts that our sense data are completely unreliable.
That is the conundrum we are potentially put in by the problem of Boltzmann Brains
(BBs) [1, 2, 3]. In brief, the BB problem arises if our universe (1) lasts forever (or at least
an extraordinarily long time, much longer than 1010
66
years), and (2) undergoes random
fluctuations that could potentially create conscious observers. If the rate of fluctuations
times the lifetime of the universe is sufficiently large, we would expect a “typical” observer
to be such a fluctuation, rather than one of the ordinary observers (OOs) that arise through
traditional thermodynamic evolution in the wake of a low-entropy Big Bang. We humans
here on Earth have a strong belief that we are OOs, not BBs, so there is apparently something
fishy about a cosmological model that predicts that almost all observers are BBs.
This mildly diverting observation becomes more pressing if we notice that the current
best-fit model for cosmology – denoted ΛCDM, where Λ stands for the cosmological constant
(vacuum energy) and CDM for “cold dark matter” – is arguably a theory that satisfies both
conditions (1) and (2). (Many eternally-inflating cosmologies potentially do so as well.) If
the vacuum energy remains constant, the universe asymptotically approaches a de Sitter
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phase. Such a spacetime resembles, in certain ways, a box of gas in equilibrium, with a
de Sitter temperature TdS =
√
Λ/12pi2 ∼ 10−33 eV. (I will use units where ~ = c = k = 1
unless explicitly indicated.) Since de Sitter space can in principle last forever, thermal
fluctuations will arguably give rise to a large number of BBs. In that case, we need to face
the prospect that our leading cosmological model, carefully constructed to fit a multitude
of astronomical observations and our current understanding of the laws of physics, actually
predicts nonsense.
As we will see, the situation is more subtle than this discussion implies; nevertheless,
the BB problem is a real one and can act as a constraint on otherwise tenable cosmological
models. The real problem is not “this model predicts more BBs than OOs, but we are not
BBs, therefore the model is ruled out.” The problem is that BB-dominated models are self-
undermining, or cognitively unstable – we cannot simultaneously believe that such a model
is correct, and believe that we have good reasons for such a belief.
In this paper I will attempt to clarify a number of potentially confusing issues about
the BB problem. In the next section, we will discuss what it actually means to be a Boltz-
mann Brain, or another kind of random fluctuation from a high-entropy state. Then we
will confront the question of what kinds of realistic cosmological scenarios actually predict
the existence of BBs, arguing that the existence of a positive cosmological constant is not
sufficient. In the subsequent two sections we will go over the argument as to why cosmologies
dominated by BBs should be rejected as realistic models of the world, and address some of
the counterarguments to that view.
2 The Origin of the Problem
To understand the Boltzmann Brain problem, it is useful to revisit the discussions between
Ludwig Boltzmann and his contemporaries in the early days of statistical mechanics near
the end of the nineteenth century. Boltzmann and others showed how to recover the major
results of thermodynamics by considering gases to be large numbers of randomly-moving
particles. In particular, the Second Law, which states that the entropy S of a closed system
will only ever stay constant or increase over time, was shown to be a matter of overwhelming
probability rather than absolute certainty.
One way of understanding this result is to use the definition of entropy that is inscribed
on Boltzmann’s tombstone:
S = k logW. (1)
Here k is Boltzmann’s constant, and W is the phase-space volume of a macrostate. That is,
we imagine taking phase space (the space of all microstates of the theory, in this case the
position and momentum of every particle) and partitioning it into sets called “macrostates.”
One common way of doing this is to define some macroscopically observable features of the
system, perhaps up to some given precision, and declaring a macrostate to be the set of all
microstates with the same observable properties. ThenW can be thought of as the number of
microstates in such a macrostate, and the entropy S is the logarithm of this number. It now
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makes sense why, starting from some low-entropy initial condition, the Second Law is likely
to hold: there are, by construction, many more high-entropy states than low-entropy ones.
There will generally be a probability that the entropy of a system will fluctuate downward,
from S1 to S2 < S1, but that probability will be exponentially suppressed by ∆S = S1−S2:
P (∆S) ∝ e−∆S. (2)
In realistic systems with many particles, this probability becomes negligibly small, so the
Second Law is extremely reliable for all practical purposes. (In very small systems with few
moving parts, fluctuations can of course be important [4, 5].)
From the very beginning of this program, objections were raised to its fundamental
assumptions. One famous objection was based on the recurrence theorem, put forward
by Poincare´ in 1890. Starting from any initial state and evolving for a sufficiently long
time, any classical Hamiltonian system with a bounded phase space will eventually return
arbitrarily closely to the original state [6]. (The quantum version of the theorem posits
finite-dimensional Hilbert space rather than bounded phase space [7, 8, 9, 1].) Poincare´
himself realized the implications for statistical mechanics:
I do not know if it has been remarked that the English kinetic theories can extract
themselves from this contradiction. The world, according to them, tends at first
toward a state where it remains for a long time without apparent change; and
this is consistent with experience; but it does not remain that way forever, if the
theorem cited above is not violated; it merely stays that way for an enormously
long time, a time which is longer the more numerous are the molecules. This state
will not be the final death of the universe, but a sort of slumber, from which it
will awake after millions of millions of centuries. According to this theory, to
see heat pass from a cold body to a warm one, it will not be necessary to have
the acute vision, the intelligence, and the dexterity of Maxwell’s demon; it will
suffice to have a little patience [6].
Equilibration is not forever, only for a very long time – recurrence times are typically expo-
nential in the maximum entropy of the system. The recurrence theorem implies that even-
tually, even a system in its highest-entropy configuration will evolve back to a low-entropy
initial state, in seeming violation of the Second Law.
It was Zermelo who turned Poincare´’s mischievous remark about recurrence into a full-
blown objection to Boltzmann’s understanding of the Second Law [10, 11]. His argument was
simple: the recurrence theorem implies that a graph of entropy vs. time must be a periodic
function, while the Second Law states that the entropy must monotonically increase, and
both cannot be simultaneously true. Zermelo believed that the Second Law was absolute,
not merely statistical, and concluded that the mechanistic underpinning to thermodynamics
offered by kinetic theory could not be valid.
Boltzmann was absolutely convinced that Zermelo’s objection was unfounded, but he
suggested multiple ways out of the apparent contradiction, and not all of the strategies were
mutually consistent [12, 13]. One of his proposals was very close to our current understanding
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of the problem: the Second Law might not always hold in an infinitely old universe, but it
can be perfectly applicable in one that has a beginning point in an initially low-entropy state:
The second law will be explained mechanically by means of assumption A (which
is of course unprovable) that the universe, considered as a mechanical system
– or at least a very large part of it which surrounds us – started from a very
improbable state, and is still in an improbable state [13].
The remark is suggested almost off-handedly, but it has deep implications. The idea that
the universe “started” in any state at all, rather than having existed forever, is not at all
obvious, and indeed seems to run counter to a straightforward understanding of conventional
Newtonian mechanics. Boltzmann was writing in 1896, well before Einstein’s formulation of
general relativity or Lemaˆıtre’s theory of the Primeval Atom, now known as the Big Bang.1
Modern treatments of the foundations of statistical mechanics generally accept the need for
a “Past Hypothesis” according to which our universe started in a low-entropy state [14, 3].
But another suggestion of Boltzmann’s went in a completely different direction. Perhaps
the universe is actually infinitely old, and on very large scales is in thermal equilibrium.
Then, just as Poincare´ noted, rare fluctuations (in space or in time) would drive it away
from a state of maximal entropy. Boltzmann’s twist was to turn lemons into lemonade:
maybe we live in the aftermath of just such a fluctuation.
There must then be in the universe, which is in thermal equilibrium as a whole
and therefore dead, here and there relatively small regions of the size of our
galaxy (which we call worlds), which during the relatively short time of eons
deviate significantly from thermal equilibrium. Among these worlds the state
probability increases as often as it decreases. For the universe as a whole the two
directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space there is no up or down.
However, just as at a certain place on the earth’s surface we can call “down” the
direction toward the centre of the earth, so a living being that finds itself in such
a world at a certain period of time can define the time direction as going from less
probable to more probable states (the former will be the “past” and the latter
the “future”) and by virtue of this definition he will find that this small region,
isolated from the rest of the universe, is “initially” always in an improbable state
[13].
(In a slightly earlier paper, he attributes this idea to “my old assistant, Dr. Schuetz” [15].)
In this passage, Boltzmann anticipates ideas that are often thought of as contemporary
and controversial.2 He imagines a vast cosmos where local conditions are very different
1We might wonder why neither Boltzmann nor his contemporaries pursued this implication further,
suggesting some kind of Big Bang even before the discoveries of general relativity or the expansion of the
universe.
2Quite a similar cosmological model, also based on order arising out of the random motions of disordered
matter, was proposed by a much earlier atomist, the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius, in the first
century BCE [16].
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in different regions, what a modern physicist would call “the multiverse.” He notes that
most of this universe is “in thermal equilibrium as a whole and therefore dead,” and hence
that it is natural we would find ourselves in a relatively atypical region that had departed
from equilibrium. This is arguably the first application of the anthropic principle in modern
science. Finally, of course, Boltzmann has perfectly internalized the highly counter-intuitive
fact that the arrow of time (a concept not fully elucidated until 1927, by Eddington) is
completely tied to the thermodynamic Second Law – we define the past as the direction of
time in which entropy is lower, and the future as the direction in which it is higher.
Interestingly, Boltzmann did not seem to recognize an apparently fatal flaw in his scenario.
That was left to Eddington, who in 1931 pointed out that anthropic reasoning only requires
the existence of intelligent observers, not an entire galaxy such as the one in which we
live. According to (2), fluctuations into low-entropy states are rare, and fluctuations into
even-lower-entropy states are exponentially more rare than that. Consequently, given any
particular anthropic criterion, Boltzmann’s fluctuation scenario should predict that we live
in a universe that has the highest possible entropy, conditioned on that criterion being met.
Eddington phrased this objection in terms of a particular anthropic criterion: the existence
of mathematical physicists (presumably ones who could work out exactly this calculation):
A universe containing mathematical physicists [under these assumptions] will
at any assigned date be in the state of maximum disorganization which is not
inconsistent with the existence of such creatures [17].
Such a universe would be extremely different from our current one. Richard Feynman thought
that these points – the puzzle of the low-entropy conditions near the Big Bang, and the
inadequacy of Boltzmann’s fluctuation scenario at addressing the problem – were sufficiently
important that they should be familiar to first-year undergraduates at Caltech, so he makes
the point in the Feynman Lectures on Physics :
[F]rom the hypothesis that the world is a fluctuation, all of the predictions are
that if we look at a part of the world we have never seen before, we will find it
mixed up, and not like the piece we just looked at. If our order were due to a
fluctuation, we would not expect order anywhere but where we have just noticed
it.
We therefore conclude that the universe is not a fluctuation, and that the order
is a memory of conditions when things started. This is not to say that we
understand the logic of it. For some reason, the universe at one time had a very
low entropy for its energy content, and since then the entropy has increased. So
that is the way toward the future. That is the origin of all irreversibility, that
is what makes the processes of growth and decay, that makes us remember the
past and not the future, remember the things which are closer to that moment
in history of the universe when the order was higher than now, and why we are
not able to remember things where the disorder is higher than now, which we
call the future [18].
6
More recently, Albrecht and Sorbo [2, 19], drawing on a discussion by Barrow and Tipler
[20], took this reasoning to its logical conclusion. If our anthropic criterion is simply “the
existence of intelligent observers,” Boltzmann’s fluctuation scenario predicts that the over-
whelming majority of such observers should be the absolutely smallest deviations from ther-
mal equilibrium that is compatible with one’s definition of an intelligent observer. Plausibly,
such a being would require only those body parts that are absolutely essential to cognition
and consciousness – it would resemble a disembodied brain surrounded by thermal equilib-
rium. These minimal observers have become known as Boltzmann Brains (BBs).
The standard concern about the Boltzmann fluctuation scenario, as reflected in the re-
marks by Eddington and Feynman, is that the high-entropy universe it predicts (with very
large probability) looks very different from the relatively orderly cosmos in which we find
ourselves. The BB phenomenon is meant to take this expectation to its logical extreme:
not only would the universe look different, but typical observers in the universe would look
utterly different from us. But as we shall see, it will pay to be a little more careful about
the precise reasons why this kind of cosmological scenario deserves to be rejected, if indeed
it does.
3 What Are Boltzmann Brains?
A Boltzmann Brain is a configuration of matter that is (along with its local environment) as
close as possible to thermal equilibrium, while still qualifying as an intelligent observer. One
might naturally worry that reasoning quantitatively about such a concept would be nearly
hopeless, given the difficulty in specifying what it means to be an “intelligent observer.”
In practice, however, such worries turn out not to be very important, due to the kinds of
numbers involved. Given any reasonable physical criteria for what constitutes a conscious
brain, the ratio of BBs to ordinary observers (OOs) in a given cosmological model is almost
always going to be very close to either 0 or 1.
We can see this in toy examples. Consider two (unrealistic, but illustrative) fiducial
universes, a short-lived one A and a long-lived one B. Imagine that both models describe
a spatial volume of order that of our currently observable universe, i.e. approximately the
Hubble length cubed:
V ∼ (H−10 c)
3 ∼ 1078 cm3, (3)
where H0 is the Hubble constant and c is the speed of light. (As we will soon see, order-
of-magnitude estimates are more than adequate in this game.) Universe A we imagine to
only last about the current age of the universe,
tA ∼ H
−1
0 ∼ 10
18 s. (4)
Even if our universe doesn’t come to an end in a big crunch, its current state could plausibly
change dramatically in a phase transition [22, 23], which would count as “ending” for these
purposes. Universe B, meanwhile, we take to persist for the recurrence time appropriate
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for a system with an entropy given by the de Sitter entropy of our universe,
tB ∼ e
SdS ∼ e10
122
s. (5)
This is an extremely long time. So much so that it doesn’t really matter what units we use
to measure it with; the number is essentially the same whether measured in Planck times or
Hubble times:
tB
(
H−10
tP
)
∼ e10
122
(
1018 s
10−43 s
)
∼ e(10
122+102) ∼ e10
122
. (6)
For this reason, in these kinds of calculations it is convenient to interpret the ∼ symbol as
meaning “within ±1 in the top exponent.”
Now let us compare the number of OOs in these universes to the number of BBs. We can
very roughly estimate the number of OOs by taking the number of stars in our observable
universe, n∗ ∼ 10
24, and imagining that the average number of ordinary observers coming
into existence around each such star within a Hubble time is some large number N¯O. The
number of people who have lived on Earth is roughly 1011, so the minimum value of N¯O
is 10−13. Let’s posit as a reasonable maximum N¯O ≤ 10
100; the exact number will depend
on one’s attitude toward conscious observers living within computer simulations constructed
by advanced civilizations. By definition, OOs live in the thermodynamically conventional
aftermath of a low-entropy Big Bang, not as fluctuations at much later times, so the number
of OOs in universes A and B is the same:
NOO(A) = NOO(B) = n∗N¯O, (7)
so that
1011 ≤ NOO(A,B) ≤ 10
124. (8)
The number of BBs, meanwhile, is given by the spacetime volume times the rate at which
BBs fluctuate into existence. The latter number will be of order e−∆S, where ∆S is the
difference in entropy between the equilibrium state and the state that is almost equilibrium
except for a single brain. (More than one brain could simultaneously fluctuate into existence,
but that is sufficiently unlikely that we can ignore the possibility.) For simplicity let us model
the universe as a thermal gas of relativistic particles with a temperature TdS ∼ 10
−33 eV (so
the particles would essentially be all photons and gravitons). The entropy of a region of
space filled with such a gas is of order the number of particles, and the energy per particle
is of order TdS. The entropy decrease when a BB is created is therefore simply the number
of thermal particles removed from the gas in order to make it; for a BB of mass M we have
∆S =
M
TdS
. (9)
If we imagine that a functioning brain needs to include at least Avogadro’s number (6×1023)
protons and neutrons, this gives us
∆S ∼ 1066. (10)
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The rate of fluctuation into a BB is therefore something like
ΓBB ∼ e
−∆S ∼ e−10
66
. (11)
(This is, again, a quantity for which units are irrelevant.) We therefore have
NBB(A) = ΓBBtAV ∼ e
−1066 × 1096 ∼ 0, (12)
while
NBB(B) = ΓBBtBV ∼ e
−1066 × e10
122
∼ e10
122
. (13)
We therefore obtain the fairly robust conclusion
NBB(A)≪ NOO(A,B)≪ NBB(B). (14)
This kind of result is common in BB calculations. Universe A, which only lasts for a Hubble
time, has almost no BBs, so OOs always win out; universe B, which lasts for a recurrence
time, is overwhelmingly dominated by BBs. For this reason, what tends to matter is not the
specifics of what constitutes a BB (or how many OOs might flourish in the aftermath of the
Big Bang), but rather whether BBs fluctuate into existence at all, and whether the universe
lasts for a short time or essentially forever. (For a more careful discussion of what might
constitute a BB, and the rate at which they are produced, see [24].)
Here are some salient features of the process by which BBs would fluctuate into existence.
For this purpose let us imagine again that we have a thermal gas of real particles; in the
next section we will ask whether that’s a reasonable model of the ultimate de Sitter vacuum.
• The raw materials for BBs would be pair-produced from photons and gravitons. Boltz-
mann imagined a gas of atoms floating around, which could randomly arrange them-
selves into low-entropy configurations. In a modern cosmological scenario, the tempera-
ture of empty de Sitter space is extremely low, much lower than the mass of the lightest
massive particles. (For current cosmological parameters, at any rate; it is also inter-
esting to think of BB creation in other parts of the multiverse, where there might be
much larger vacuum energy and correspondingly higher temperatures.) The eventual
empty universe is therefore dominated by massless particles – photons and gravitons,
neither of which are likely to assemble into conscious observers, since their interactions
are so weak that it is hard to imagine forming bound states other than black holes.
Nevertheless, there can be collisions between rare high-energy photons or gravitons,
which could pair-produce electrons and positrons, or protons and anti-protons, and so
forth. The general tendency of such pairs would be to re-annihilate rather quickly, but
occasionally the new particles will have enough momentum to travel far apart from
each other. Sometimes (rarely, as should be henceforth understood) many such col-
lisions will happen nearby, producing enough nearby matter to assemble itself into a
macroscopic object such as a brain.
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• BBs are assembled slowly. It’s tempting to think of the fluctuation process as something
relatively rapid: a BB materializes into existence in a flash of colliding high-energy par-
ticles, after which it lives and thinks for however long it is able to in its rather harsh
environment. This story is unjustifiably asymmetric in time. If the macroscopic BB
configuration does not itself have a good deal of time-directedness (such as angular
momentum), it’s not hard to show that most fluctuation processes are statistically
identical forward and backward in time around the moment of minimum entropy [25].
The way that BBs usually get assembled, in other words, is just the time-reverse of
how they will ultimately decay. If the decay process is one of first freezing, then grad-
ually disassembling, the creation process will involve relatively gradual assembly of
individual pieces, followed by a relatively quick heating-up. There may be interesting
bio-chemical-physical questions about how long it would take a BB to completely dis-
sipate in empty space; the point is that, however long that is, the assembly process
takes just as long. (If the BB is conscious and experiences the flow of time after it is
created, it is natural to think that it was likely to have been conscious and experienc-
ing a “reversed” arrow of time during the creation process, although the precise link
between the thermodynamic and psychological arrows of time is controversial [26, 27].)
• Any specified class of macroscopic object can fluctuate into existence. The original
impetus for Boltzmann’s suggestion came from the Poincare´ recurrence theorem, but
the BB problem relies only on random fluctuations, not precise recurrence of any given
configuration. The relevant property is therefore ergodicity – the system will explore
the entirety of its phase space, given enough time – rather than recurrence. Not all
physical systems are ergodic, but to bring the BB problem to life we only need local
subsystems to behave ergodically, not the universe as a whole. That seems extremely
reasonable (though I don’t know of a theorem), given that subsystems are generally
open and receive random perturbations from their surrounding environments.
• The most common fluctuations will be as close to equilibrium overall as possible. We
expect not only Boltzmann Brains, but also Boltzmann People, Boltzmann Solar Sys-
tems, Boltzmann Galaxies, or even Boltzmann Universes, to eventually fluctuate into
existence. Given any particular criterion that we may look for in a fluctuation (such
as “the existence of an intelligent observer,” or “the existence of a civilization that
lasts for at least a million years”), the probability formula (2) implies that the most
common such fluctuation will be the one with the highest entropy overall. In ordinary,
thermodynamically-sensible evolution from low-entropy initial conditions, real physical
structures often contain substantial mutual information – there are strong correlations
between, for example, the state of a camera that has just taken a picture and the
state of whatever it was pointed at when the image was taken. There is no reason to
expect such correlations in Boltzmann fluctuations, if they are not specifically sought
after as part of the criteria defining the fluctuations we are considering. If a camera
with an image in its memory (or a person with a memory in their brain) fluctuates
into existence, it is overwhelmingly likely that the rest of the universe will still be in
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thermal equilibrium.
One might imagine raising a “Darwinian” objection to the BB problem: “the most
likely way that a complex biological organ such as a brain can appear is not through
random fluctuations, but via biological evolution under the pressure of natural selec-
tion.” This objection misunderstands the role of entropy in the situation. The envi-
ronment of our biosphere, in which actual brains evolve, is an open system driven very
far from equilibrium, as a direct result of its descent from the extremely low-entropy
early universe. In that context, biological evolution is naturally the best way of cre-
ating brains. But starting from equilibrium, creating brains by first fluctuating into
the state of our early universe (or even just of our biosphere) is enormously less likely
than creating individual brains uncorrelated with their environments.
• The BB scenario relies on the fact that the laws of physics are Markovian (memoryless).
As with correlations in space at one moment, ordinary thermodynamically-sensible
evolution also induces correlations across time. A photograph of a birthday party from
twenty years ago is highly correlated with what happened at the party. Boltzmann
fluctuations have no such correlations; just because a photo fluctuates into existence, it
doesn’t follow that a birthday party must have fluctuated years earlier. We can say this
with confidence because the current state of a physical system suffices, according to
our best known laws of physics, to determine its subsequent evolution. In the context
of stochastic processes this feature is known as the “Markov property,” but ever since
Laplace we have appreciated that the laws of physics seem to be memoryless in this
sense. Therefore, the existence of a memory in a BB at the present time – including
the expectation that the BB will act as if the memory is real and reliable, to the best
of its knowledge – is a statement about the current state of the BB, without any strong
connection to past events. There is no reason for a BB’s impressions of either the past,
or the current state of the world elsewhere, to be at all accurate.
4 What Theories Predict Boltzmann Brains?
Boltzmann envisioned an eternal Newtonian universe, with a fixed background spacetime
and an infinite number of randomly-fluctuating particles. The shift to a general-relativistic
perspective, where spacetime is dynamical and responds to energy and matter, changes
the picture dramatically. Our universe is expanding from a hot Big Bang state of about
14 billion years ago. Classically, there are two natural possibilities. The universe could
eventually recollapse, in which case its lifetime is very likely to be much less than the time
for even a single BB to fluctuate into existence, and there is not a BB problem. Alternatively,
the universe could expand forever. Then we expect the density of matter to dilute away to
zero, leaving nothing around from which BBs could be created. Either way, for most of the
20th century cosmologists were not worrying about Boltzmann Brains.
In 1998 we found strong evidence [28, 29], since verified by a number of independent tech-
niques, that our universe is accelerating. The simplest and most likely (though not only)
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explanation for this is the existence of a constant vacuum energy, equivalent to Einstein’s
cosmological constant Λ. The cosmological constant is plausibly (though, again, not neces-
sarily) constant for all time. In that case, we would seem to have resolved the choice between
recollapsing and ever-expanding universes, in favor of perpetual expansion. The cosmic no-
hair theorem [30] implies that our universe will evolve toward the geometry of de Sitter
space, the maximally symmetric solution to general relativity with a positive cosmological
constant.
By itself that doesn’t change the status of the BB problem – classically, space still empties
of particles, even in the presence of vacuum energy. But quantum mechanics now enters in
a significant way. Like a black hole, de Sitter space has a horizon; unlike a black hole,
we think of ourselves as being surrounded by the horizon, rather than looking at it from
outside. Objects that are sufficiently far away (roughly the Hubble radius, H−10 ∼ 10
10
light-years) cannot send signals to us even at the speed of light, since the space in between
is expanding too rapidly. In the 1970’s, Hawking showed that quantum effects near black
hole horizons cause black holes to give off black-body radiation with a temperature inversely
proportional to the hole’s mass [31]. Soon thereafter, Gibbons and Hawking [32] showed that
the de Sitter horizon acts in a similar way, producing thermal radiation with a temperature
TdS =
√
Λ/12pi2. Put somewhat more carefully, a particle detector in its ready state will, in
the quantum vacuum of de Sitter, detect particles with such a spectrum.
This creates a somewhat surprising situation. While classically a universe dominated by a
positive cosmological constant simply empties out and evolves to zero temperature, quantum-
mechanically it asymptotes to a fixed nonzero temperature. Such a universe resembles quite
closely Boltzmann’s original idea: an eternal thermal system with statistical fluctuations.
It is therefore reasonable to worry that BBs will be produced in the eventual future, and
dominate the number of intelligent observers in the universe. Note that this conclusion
doesn’t involve speculative ideas such as eternal inflation, the cosmological multiverse, or
the string theory landscape – it refers to ordinary ΛCDM, the best-fit model constructed
by cosmologists to describe the universe we live in today. We therefore face the prospect
that our best modern cosmological model is internally incoherent. (The BB problem is
also, needless to say, an important criterion for judging the empirical viability of different
manifestations of the multiverse. In that context it is often the case that the question
depends sensitively on one’s favorite approach to the “cosmological measure problem” –
how to compare the relative number of observers of different types in a large multiverse
[35, 36, 33, 34, 37, 38, 24, 39, 40, 41]. That issue is outside the scope of our discussion here.)
This conclusion is, at least plausibly, too quick, as argued by Boddy, Carroll, and Pollack
(BCP) [42] (see also Gott [43]). The quantum vacuum state in a de Sitter spacetime back-
ground is a stationary state, one that doesn’t evolve with time. (In conventional cosmological
coordinate systems space expands in de Sitter, but there are coordinates in which space is
static, reflecting the existence of a timelike Killing vector.) If we take a horizon-sized patch
of space and trace out degrees of freedom outside, the density matrix describing the patch
is thermal, as expected from the Gibbons-Hawking calculation. But that thermal density
matrix is also stationary; there are no time-dependent fluctuations. BCP therefore argued
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that there aren’t true dynamical processes in the de Sitter quantum vacuum state that would
produce BBs, so the problem simply doesn’t arise.
There is a possibility of confusion here, due to the sloppy way in which physicists use the
word “quantum fluctuation.” It’s helpful to distinguish between three different notions [44]:
• Vacuum fluctuations are the differences between a quantum state and some appro-
priate classical analogue. These are captured by the notion of a non-zero variance for
observable properties; given a state |ψ〉 and some observable Ô, we have 〈Ô2〉ψ ≥ 〈Ô〉
2
ψ.
The position of an electron in an atomic orbital, for example, is not localized to a posi-
tion eigenstate. Vacuum fluctuations are present even in stationary states, but do not
represent time-dependent dynamical processes. Examples include the Casimir effect
and radiative corrections to physical parameters in quantum field theory.
• Measurement-induced fluctuations are the stochastic observational outcomes re-
sulting from repeating the process of putting a system into some state, measuring some
property of it, then returning it to the original state.
• Boltzmann fluctuations are true dynamical processes in which entropy decreases,
resulting from stochastic dynamics in time-dependent states. They can be present if
a microstate is time-dependent even if its corresponding coarse-grained macrostate is
not; e.g. a box of gas in equilibrium can fluctuate to a lower-entropy state. BBs would
be examples of Boltzmann fluctuations.
BCP argue that there are vacuum fluctuations in de Sitter space, and there would be
measurement-induced fluctuations in the presence of an out-of-equilibrium measuring de-
vice; but there is no such measuring device in the vacuum, and there are no Boltzmann
fluctuations in a stationary state. Therefore, BBs don’t appear in the true de Sitter vacuum.
This argument was made in the context of Everettian (many-worlds) quantum mechanics,
but similar arguments apply to Bohmian mechanics [45].
This conclusion is not uncontroversial. It relies on a particular construal of what “hap-
pens” in a stationary quantum state: i.e., that nothing really happens at all, in contrast to
conventional quantum measurement processes, which involve decoherence, branching of the
wave function, and an increase of entropy in the system’s density matrix. An alternative
perspective would be to argue that something “happens” if it occurs within a history that
is part of a decoherent set of histories. As Lloyd has argued [46], it is straightforward to
construct sets of decoherent histories in which all sorts of interesting dynamical processes
take place, even if the overall density matrix corresponds to a pure stationary quantum
state. Taking this as our criteria for the existence of BBs, it follows that BBs are inevitable
in almost any cosmological model. Indeed, BBs would occur even in the Minkowski vacuum,
with zero cosmological constant and zero temperature; this possibility has been considered
[21, 22, 47, 48], but it seems very different from the standard picture of thermal de Sitter
fluctuations.
Relatedly, the absence of dynamical observers in a stationary state also relies on the
global branching structure of the Everettian wave function. Given any density matrix for a
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subsystem, there are a large number of different possible purifications in the larger Hilbert
space. Bennett and Riedel [49] have pointed out that one could imagine purifications that
entangled truly dynamical states of any given de Sitter patch (including BBs or OOs of
whatever kind) with decohered pointer states in the external environment, while maintaining
the feature that the full de Sitter patch density matrix was stationary and thermal. In
that case a conscientious Everettian would judge that there really were dynamical observers
within the patch, even though their existence could not be discerned by studying the density
matrix alone. It seems unlikely that this kind of state is actually what arises in conventional
cosmological evolution, but both of these potential loopholes in the claim that there are no
BBs in the de Sitter vacuum are worthy of further study.
The idea that BBs are absent in the stationary de Sitter vacuum is only relevant if
cosmological evolution brings us to that vacuum state. In the context of quantum field
theory in curved spacetime, this is what we expect to happen, at least in local regions of
space, according to quantum versions of the cosmic no-hair theorem [50, 51]. It’s possible,
however, that the situation changes dramatically in true quantum gravity, as argued by
Dyson, Kleban, and Susskind (DKS) [1].
Just as with a black-hole horizon, the de Sitter horizon can be associated with an entropy
proportional to its area:
SdS =
A
4G
=
3pi
GΛ
. (15)
For the measured vacuum energy, this works out to approximately SdS ∼ 10
122. According
to the philosophy of horizon complementarity [52], the interior of the horizon is therefore a
system described by a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, with
dimH ≈ eSdS = e10
122
. (16)
(See also [53, 2, 54, 55].) By itself this doesn’t bear directly on the question of BBs; a
finite-dimensional open system can asymptote to its vacuum state by dissipating excitations
into its surrounding environment. But horizon complementarity suggests a more radical
viewpoint, where this finite-dimensional system should be thought of as describing the entire
theory; everything we would conventionally think of as “the rest of the universe” is encoded
as information on the horizon itself. Different observers will describe the location of the
de Sitter horizon differently, but all will give compatible descriptions of regions of spacetime
that overlap between different horizons.
Finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are the quantum analogue of bounded phase spaces in
classical mechanics, and they have a corresponding recurrence theorem. If evolution is uni-
tary and Hilbert space is finite-dimensional, the state will not simply evolve to the de Sitter
vacuum and stay there, as it would if Hilbert space were infinite-dimensional. Observable
deviations from the vacuum might be extremely small, but they would always be present.
Therefore, we expect not only recurrence, but Boltzmann fluctuations into all manner of
low-entropy states. DKS pointed out that the presence of such fluctuations renders ΛCDM
unacceptable as a realistic cosmological model (if we accept the appropriate interpretation
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of horizon complementarity), and Albrecht and Sorbo [2] connected this directly to the
Boltzmann Brain problem.
One loophole in this analysis appears if our current vacuum state with its cosmological
constant is only one of many vacua in the theory, including a Minkowski vacuum with Λ = 0.
That is quite plausible in a number of theories, including the landscape of string theory, where
different ways that extra dimensions can be compactified lead to a proliferation of metastable
vacuum states [56, 57, 58]. As long as there is at least one Λ = 0 vacuum, the Hilbert space
of the full theory will be infinite-dimensional. It is then conceivable, as suggested by BCP,
that the dynamics in a de Sitter vacuum are effectively dissipative, and the state will settle
into an asymptotically stationary quantum state, free of BBs.
There is also a more direct way in which the existence of other vacua could save us from
the BB problem: if the decay rate of a de Sitter vacuum into a lower-energy one is sufficiently
fast that BBs don’t have time to form [22, 23]. Such decays happen via bubble nucleation: a
microscopically small region of space undergoes a quantum tunneling to a lower-energy state,
creating a spherical bubble that expands at nearly the speed of light. If bubbles ultimately
collide and fill space, the phase transition is said to have “percolated.” As in the examples
of universes A and B above, a relatively short-lived universe will produce essentially no BBs,
even if it is possible for them to fluctuate into existence; indeed, vacuum decay is the most
straightforward way to obtain a short-lived universe such as A. (The universe as a whole
might last for a long time, but all that matters for the BB problem is the amount of time it
spends in the appropriate de Sitter vacuum.)
Percolation is harder to achieve than one might think, for the simple reason that the
space in between the bubbles is expanding and accelerating. Roughly speaking, the bubble
nucleation rate must be of order one per Hubble spacetime volume or greater. Otherwise,
even as new bubbles come into existence, the spatial volume in the original vacuum continues
to grow exponentially, and the transition never completes, leaving room for an unlimited
number of future BBs. This raises the somewhat alarming prospect that the vacuum in which
we currently find ourselves might be unstable over timescales comparable to the current age
of the universe. Interestingly, the measured properties of the Higgs boson suggest that its
potential is conceivably unstable over just such timescales [59, 60, 61, 62, 63].
The bad news is that life as we know it would be eliminated by decay to a lower-energy
vacuum, which would leave behind nothing but empty space. As Coleman and de Luccia
memorably put it in their analysis of false-vacuum decay,
The possibility that we are living in a false vacuum has never been a cheering
one to contemplate. Vacuum decay is the ultimate ecological catastrophe; in the
new vacuum there are new constants of nature; after vacuum decay, not only is
life as we know it impossible, so is chemistry as we know it. However, one could
always draw stoic comfort from the possibility that perhaps in the course of time
the new vacuum would sustain, if not life as we know it, at least some structures
capable of knowing joy. This possibility has now been eliminated [64].
Fortunately, even if the nucleation rate is as high as 1 per current Hubble volume per Hubble
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time, there is only a 10−8 chance that a bubble of lower-energy vacuum will intersect the
Earth over a century-long human lifetime.
5 Why Are Boltzmann Brains Bad?
The standard (but not quite correct) argument that cosmologies dominated by BBs are
unacceptable is fairly straightforward: in such a universe, I would probably be a Boltzmann
Brain, and I’m not, therefore that’s not the universe in which we live.
Many people fail to find the standard argument convincing, on the grounds that the exis-
tence of observers elsewhere in the universe and very different from themselves shouldn’t call
into question the success of a model that seems to correctly account for what they see around
them (see e.g. [53, 43]). Consider a conversation between a scientist W who worries that
BBs render otherwise reasonable cosmological scenarios unacceptable, and another scientist
S who is more sanguine.
W : I am worried that our best cosmological model predicts that typical ob-
servers are Boltzmann Brains.
S : Why? Sure, there may be a huge number of BBs in this universe, but I’m
not one of them, so what do I care?
W : How do you know you’re not a Boltzmann Brain?
S : I don’t seem very brain-like. I have arms, legs, etc. The environment
around me seems pretty dramatically far from equilibrium.
W : Fine. But in a large, randomly-fluctuating universe, even if you are not
a minimal-fluctuation observer (a BB), it’s overwhelmingly likely that you are
in a state that represents the minimum possible fluctuation away from equilib-
rium, conditioned on whatever features your local environment has. Call these
“Boltzmann Observers” (BOs). Even granting that you have arms and legs and
are sitting in an office, it’s still overwhelmingly likely that all of that has ran-
domly fluctuated into existence out of equilibrium. How do you know you’re not
a Boltzmann Observer?
S : Because I can see that I’m not! I can go out and, for example, observe the
cosmic microwave background, which is evidence that the universe was in a much
lower-entropy state several billion years ago, which isn’t what I would expect if
I were a BO.
W : But even if you are observing the microwave background, you’re not
necessarily seeing the leftover photons from the Big Bang. You’re seeing a radi-
ation field entering your telescope right here in your nearby environment. In a
fluctuating-universe scenario, it’s certainly possible to see such photons, but it’s
overwhelmingly likely that they randomly fluctuated into existence, without any
connection to an earlier low-entropy state.
S : Well, that scenario makes a very reliable prediction, as Feynman basically
pointed out: all I have to do is look in my radio telescope again, and see whether
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or not the background radiation is still there. If what I observed already is just
a random fluctuation, there’s no reason for it to persist over time; in fact it’s
incredibly unlikely. So let me wait a second before checking again and... Nope.
There’s the microwave background. I still seem to be in a thermodynamically
sensible environment. I am not a BO.
W : You don’t have the right to conclude that. In a randomly-fluctuating uni-
verse, just as almost all observers are minimal-fluctuation BBs, and almost all
observers with arms and legs and microwave backgrounds are minimal-fluctuation
BOs subject to those macroscopic constraints, it’s also the case that almost all
of the observers with arms etc. who believe they have just waited a few sec-
onds and failed to observe any evidence of the surrounding equilibrium are also
random fluctuations with just those properties. You can conditionalize on any
macroscopic information you like: in a randomly-fluctuating universe, it remains
overwhelmingly likely that you are at a local minimum of entropy that evolved
by chance out of equilibrium.
S : But everything I know and feel and think about the world is what I would
expect if I were an ordinary observer who has arisen in the aftermath of a low-
entropy Big Bang, and nothing that I perceive is what I would expect if I were a
random fluctuation.
W : And in a randomly-fluctuating universe, the overwhelming majority of
people who would say exactly that are, as a matter of fact, random fluctuations.
That’s why those kinds of cosmological models are bad.
I will argue that cosmologies dominated by BBs should be rejected, not because I have
empirical evidence that I am not one and I should be, but because such models are cognitively
unstable.
5.1 The standard argument
Let’s rehearse the standard argument in somewhat more formal terms. Bayes’s Theorem
relates P (Ti|D), the posterior credences we attach to a set of mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive propositions (“theories”) Ti after gathering some data D, to the prior credences P (Ti)
and the likelihoods P (D|Ti) that such data would be obtained if each proposition were true:
P (Ti|D) =
P (D|Ti)P (Ti)
P (D)
, (17)
where the total probability of obtaining the data is P (D) =
∑
i P (D|Ti). We would like to
use this expression to judge the relative credence we should assign to different cosmological
models, where the “data” is taken to be our experience – that we seem to be ordinary
observers rather than BBs, or at least that we seem to be embedded in a certain kind of
environment that is highly out-of-equilibrium and nicely consistent with thermodynamically
conventional evolution from a low-entropy beginning.
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Consider our two model universes, A with very few BBs, and B in which BBs far out-
number OOs, so that our two propositions are TA and TB (we live in universe A or B,
respectively). The standard argument assumes that the likelihoods for our observed data in
each theory are roughly proportional to the fraction of observers that are OOs:
P (D|Ti) ∼
NOO
NOO +NBB(Ti)
∼
{
1 A,
e−10
122
B,
(18)
where the numbers are taken from (8), (12), and (13), and we are assuming comparable
numbers of ordinary observers in the two theories. This form for the likelihoods is equivalent
to an assumption of “the Copernican principle” or “mediocrity” or “typicality” or “self-
sampling” or “indifference” concerning who we are in the universe: given some reference
class of intelligent observers, we are equally likely to have been any of them, and should
reason accordingly [65, 66, 67, 68]. The numbers in (18) are so wildly disparate that, for a
very wide range of possible priors, we can immediately conclude to a high degree of confidence
that we live in cosmology A, the short-lived one without BBs. This formalizes the intuition
that BBs must be sub-dominant because we are not ourselves BBs.
It’s always possible, of course, to choose priors that can overcome even dramatic differ-
ences in likelihoods. It might seem fair to assign priors P (TA) and P (TB) that are roughly
equal to each other, on the theory that we are comparing two cosmological models of compa-
rable plausibility. But one might alternatively adopt a “self-indication assumption” (SIA),
according to which we should reason as if we were chosen randomly from the set of all pos-
sible (rather than actual) observers [67, 68]. Effectively, SIA can be thought of as boosting
the prior for theories with BBs by an enormous amount, simply because there are a lot of
observers in them:
P (Ti) ∝ NOO +NBB(Ti). (19)
This factor would then cancel the suppression in (18), undermining the standard argument
against BB-dominated cosmologies.
Bostrom [67] has given an argument against giving higher priors to theories with more
observers in them, which he labels the “Presumptuous Philosopher problem.” Consider two
competing theories that don’t have any BBs at all, but that differ substantially in the
number of predicted OOs (and are otherwise indistinguishable). Weighting the priors by
the number of observers would allow us to essentially rule out – perhaps to extremely high
confidence – the universe with fewer observers, even without taking any data or performing
any other traditional scientific investigation. The point is that the seemingly innocent and
humble assumption that “we are typical observers” isn’t innocent at all – it actually grants
us enormous leverage in deciding between competing models, by implying that “typical
observers are like us.” It seems presumptuous to be able to convincingly rule out simple,
plausible cosmological scenarios by such non-empirical arguments, just by thinking rather
than by collecting data. Let us therefore proceed under the assumption that that the priors
for theories A and B are comparable.
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5.2 Typicality and likelihoods
The idea that we should reason as if we are typical observers, and therefore that the relevant
likelihoods should obey (18), has been criticized by Hartle and Srednicki (HS) [69, 70] (also
[71], or for an opposing view [38]). Their argument is closely related to the Presumptuous
Philosopher problem. Imagine we learned enough about biochemistry that we were con-
vinced the probability of life coming into existence in the atmosphere of Jupiter was 0.5,
and furthermore that if such life did arise, with probability 1 it would evolve an intelligent
species (perhaps the floating gas bags envisioned by Carl Sagan) with 1012 individuals alive
today. There are therefore two scenarios in front of us, with equal priors: one in which
humans are the only intelligent observers in the Solar System, the other of which over 99%
of the intelligent observers are Jovians. HS point out that adopting the likelihoods (18), with
the role of OOs and BBs replaced by humans and Jovians, respectively, would lead us to
conclude that there was less than a one percent chance that the Jovians existed, even though
we haven’t actually gone to look for them. That’s because, in the scenario where there are
any Jovians at all, a typical intelligent observer in the Solar System is a Jovian, so the fact
that we are human counts as strong evidence against their existence. Once again, we seem
to have helped ourselves to very strong conclusions about the universe without looking at it.
To protect against such presumptuousness, HS argue that a theory of cosmology should
be thought of as coming in two parts: a physical model of the universe Ti, which specifies
(among other things) the number of any particular kind of observer, and a xerographic
distribution ξ
(i)
a , which for each physical model Ti specifies the probability distribution for us
to actually be any of the observers in the model. One example of a xerographic distribution
would simply be uniform: among all observers, we have an equal probability to be any one
of them,
ξU =
1
NOO +NBB
. (20)
Here we have classified every observer as either an OO – defined as observers arising from
thermodynamically sensible evolution from very low-entropy conditions, with the ability
to draw more or less accurate conclusions about what those conditions were by observing
features of their present environment – or a BB (even if the observer is much more than just
a brain). But we can also consider distributions that are concentrated entirely on OOs, even
in universes that have huge number of BBs in them :
ξOO =
{
0 BBs,
1
NOO
OOs.
(21)
Therefore, we can imagine a cosmological model such as our universe B (which lasts for a
recurrence time), but which comes equipped with either a uniform xerographic distribution
ξU or one ξO that is concentrated on OOs. In that case, the likelihood (18) corresponding to
(B, ξU) would be small as before, but the one for (B, ξOO) would be of order unity. The data
that we do not seem to be BBs would count against B with the uniform distribution, but B
with a concentrated distribution would be perfectly acceptable, and we would have no right
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to reject a long-lived cosmological model with dynamical fluctuations (unless the prior were
chosen to be very small).
As mentioned in the above dialogue, however, we don’t quite have data that we are
not BBs, or at least not that we aren’t Boltzmann Observers who randomly fluctuated into
existence in the conditions we seem to find ourselves in. Given only that we are some kind
of observer, and a cosmology dominated by random fluctuations, it would indeed be unlikely
that we would seem to find ourselves surrounded by a thermodynamically sensible out-of-
equilibrium environment; but given that we are exactly the kind of observers we are, in
a randomly-fluctuating universe it is still overwhelmingly likely that our recent past isn’t
nearly as low-entropy as we think it is.
A useful approach to the typicality issue that avoids the Presumptuous Philosopher
problem, but doesn’t sweep the BB problem under the rug, is the suggestion by Neal that
we apply “Full Non-indexical Conditioning” (FNC) to our place in the universe [72]. FNC
can be summarized by allowing us to use all of the data we currently possess – our personal
memories (which might not be accurate, but we have them), the image we perceive of our
immediate environments, etc. – but if there are multiple observers within the resulting
class, we should reason as if we are chosen from a uniform distribution within that set.
Denoting the data available to some particular observer as D∗, this corresponds to choosing
a xerographic distribution of the form
ξFNC =
{
0 D 6= D∗,
1
ND∗
D = D∗.
(22)
Within this scheme, our existence doesn’t imply anything about the possibility of many
intelligent observers floating in the atmosphere of Jupiter, since our data tells us we are not
Jovians.
While there is a superficial resemblance between the distributions (21) and (22), however,
their implications are very different. In a cosmological model of a long-lived universe with
random fluctuations, there is unlikely to be more than one OO who has exactly my data (at
least within any given Hubble volume), but vast numbers of observers with that data will
come from Boltzmann fluctuations. So while conditioning on all the data I have protects me
from drawing presumptuous conclusions about life on other planets, it keeps the standard
Boltzmann Brain problem completely intact.
The question, then, comes down completely to what kind of priors we should attach to
xerographic distributions such as (21) and (22). There is a crucial philosophical difference
between them: the FNC choice (22) restricts to a class of observers on the basis of the
data they have, while the distribution concentrated on OOs (21) references facts that the
observers themselves cannot possibly access in their current situation – namely, whether the
superficial evidence for a low-entropy past is accurate, or merely a random fluctuation.
That seems like cheating – biasing a xerographic distribution toward a particular answer
(we are OOs), not because we have any evidence for it, but because it’s the answer we prefer.
After all, in a long-lived, randomly-fluctuating universe, there would be plenty of observers
who arose as random fluctuations rather than from an ultra-low-entropy Big Bang, but who
20
nevertheless drew more or less accurate conclusions about the laws of physics governing their
world (even if their number would be dwarfed by the number of true Boltzmann Brains).
This would include the kinds of observers Boltzmann himself had in mind, who lived in the
aftermath of a fluctuation sufficiently large to make a galaxy like ours, but not necessarily the
trillions of galaxies within our observable universe. There would even be many observers who
were temporarily fooled, but then successfully updated their models when new data came in
(e.g. when the cosmic microwave background suddenly disappeared from their telescopes).
Why should we choose a large prior for a xerographic distribution that constitutes an a priori
denial that we could possibly be such observers? It seems like we have once again donned
the robes of the Presumptuous Philosopher, albeit with a different choice of fabric.
5.3 Cognitive instability
The standard argument against BB-dominated cosmologies is that, in such a cosmology, I
should be a BB, but I’m not, therefore that’s not the universe I live in. But the analysis above
undermines this reasoning somewhat. The caution against presumptuously philosophizing
suggests that we should not think of ourselves as being chosen randomly from the set of all
intelligent observers in the universe; this gives us too much leverage over what the universe
is like, without us actually looking at it. But it also suggests that it’s correct to think of
ourselves as being chosen randomly from a very restricted class of observers – perhaps as
restricted as “observers with precisely my macroscopic data.” This prevents us from drawing
unwarranted conclusions about other observers in the cosmos, while not sneaking in any
unjustified features of our own place within it.
The xerographic distribution (22) we are left with, however, doesn’t quite do the job of
supporting the standard BB argument. While we know (or at least seem to perceive) that we
are not disembodied brains floating in an otherwise empty void, we don’t know that we and
our local environments haven’t fluctuated into existence from a higher-entropy equilibrium
state – in a long-lived, randomly-fluctuating universe, it’s overwhelmingly likely that we have
indeed done so. We can’t claim to have empirical evidence against this disturbing possibility.
What we can do, however, is recognize that it’s no way to go through life. The data
that an observer just like us has access to includes not only our physical environment, but
all of the (purported) memories and knowledge in our brains. In a randomly-fluctuating
scenario, there’s no reason for this “knowledge” to have any correlation whatsoever with the
world outside our immediate sensory reach. In particular, it’s overwhelmingly likely that
everything we think we know about the laws of physics, and the cosmological model we have
constructed that predicts we are likely to be random fluctuations, has randomly fluctuated
into our heads. There is certainly no reason to trust that our knowledge is accurate, or that
we have correctly deduced the predictions of this cosmological model.
A randomly-fluctuating Boltzmann universe puts us, then, in a strange predicament. On
the one hand, we use our reasoning skills and knowledge of physics to deduce that in such a
cosmos we are probably randomly-fluctuated observers, even after conditioning on our local
data. On the other hand, we can also deduce that we then have no reason to trust those
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reasoning skills or that knowledge of physics.
The randomly-fluctuating universe scenario is therefore self-undermining, or as Albert
has characterized similar situations in statistical mechanics, cognitively unstable [14, 3, 73].
If you reason yourself into believing that you live in such a universe, you have to conclude
that you have no justification for accepting your own reasoning. You cannot simultaneously
conclude that you live in a randomly-fluctuating universe and believe that you have good
reason for concluding that. In (what most of us believe to be) the real world, in which
there really was a low-entropy Big Bang in the relatively recent past, our memories and
deductions about the past rely on a low-entropy Past Hypothesis for their justification. In a
universe dominated by Boltzmann fluctuations, such an hypothesis is lacking, and we can’t
trust anything we think we know.
How are we to treat the prospect of a cognitively unstable theory? We can’t say for sure
that it is not true – it’s possible that we do live in a fluctuation away from equilibrium,
perhaps with completely false memories of the past. We can’t even collect evidence that
would noticeably decrease our credence in the possibility, as such evidence is also likely to
have fluctuated into our hands.
The best we can do is to decline to entertain the possibility that the universe is described
by a cognitively unstable theory, by setting our prior for such a possibility to zero (or at
least very close to it). That is what priors are all about: setting credences for models on the
basis of how simple and reasonable they seem to be before we have collected any relevant
data. It seems unreasonable to grant substantial credence to the prospect that we have no
right to be granting substantial credence to anything. If we discover that a certain otherwise
innocuous cosmological model doesn’t allow us to have a reasonable degree of confidence in
science and the empirical method, it makes sense to reject that model, if only on pragmatic
grounds. This includes theories in which the universe is dominated by Boltzmann Brains
and other random fluctuations. It’s not that we’ve gathered evidence against such theories
by noticing that we are not BBs; it’s that we should discard such theories from consideration
even before we’ve looked.
It’s important that we’re not merely discarding the possibility that we ourselves are BBs;
we are discarding the cosmological models in which they dominate. We might ask whether
this kind of reasoning should simply lead us to reject xerographic distributions that allow
us to be observers whose memories are not accurate – the universe is full of BBs, but we’re
not among them. But as discussed above, this represents a criterion based on facts about
our location in the universe that we ourselves do not have access to, which raises immediate
problems. As a matter of empirical observation, there are many people around us who have
wildly inaccurate memories or understandings of the laws of physics; it would seem dubious
to exclude them from our xerographic distribution. In a long-lived, randomly-fluctuating
universe, the dividing line between observers that have been fooled by statistically unlikely
data and those than have simply drawn incorrect conclusions from the data they’ve collected
is a hard one to draw. And many observers with data just like ours may have been fooled thus
far, but will eventually figure things out when they realize that the microwave background
has disappeared. We are on much safer footing when we choose xerographic distributions that
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discriminate on the basis of the currently observed situations that observers are in, rather
than the accuracy of their deductions or the sensibility of their thermodynamic evolutions.
6 Conclusions
We therefore conclude that the right strategy is to reject cosmological models that would be
dominated by Boltzmann Brains (or at least Boltzmann Observers among those who have
data just like ours), not because we have empirical evidence against them, but because they
are cognitively unstable and therefore self-undermining and unworthy of serious considera-
tion. If we construct a model such as ΛCDM or a particular instantiation of the inflationary
multiverse that seems to lead us into such a situation, our job as cosmologists is to modify it
until this problem is solved, or search for a better theory. This is very useful guidance when
it comes to the difficult task of building theories that describe the universe as a whole.
Fortunately, the criterion that random fluctuations dominate the fraction of observers in
a given cosmological model might not be as difficult to evade as might be naively expected, if
Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional and local de Sitter phases settle into a truly stationary
vacuum state, free of dynamical Boltzmann fluctuations. That conclusion depends sensitively
on how one interprets what happens inside the quantum state, an issue that is unfortunately
murky in the current state of the art. If any were needed, this gives further impetus to the
difficult task of reconciling the foundations of quantum mechanics and cosmology.
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